Intentionality
The cardinal principle of phenomenology, the concept of intentionality originated with the Scholastics in the medieval period and was resurrected by Brentano in the nineteenth century which in turn influenced Husserl's conception of phenomenology. Each of the major phenomenological philosophers who were inspired by Husserl differ significantly in their respective conceptions of it. Generally, intentionality represents an alternative to the representational theory of consciousness, which holds that reality cannot be grasped directly because it is only available to the subject through perceptions of reality that are 'represented' in the mind. Husserl countered that consciousness is not 'in' the mind but rather conscious-of-something other than itself (the intentional object), whether the object in question is an actual substance or a figment of imagination, so that the question of the 'realness' of one's perceptions is bracketed. Thus the phenomenological method treats the world neither as a construct of the subject nor as existing independently of the subject, relying instead on the description of phenomena as they are given to consciousness in their immediacy. According to Husserl, phenomenology is not concerned with the scientific study of objects, nor is it a solipsism devoted solely to the subject; rather, it is a science of experience that neither concentrates exclusively on the object or the subject of experience but on the point of contact where being and consciousness meet. Hence consciousness is viewed as intentional because it is directed towards objects that exist in an intentionally constituted world. Put simply, consciousness does not exist without an object of consciousness; thus there is no such thing as empty consciousness or a receptacle of consciousness 'in' which objects may collect. This conception of intentionality is complementary to recent trends in psychoanalysis that emphasise the relational and object-seeking components of experience, but without Husserl's painstaking critique concerning the nature of experience itself.
*Heidegger retains the concept of intentionality in his early work (Being and Time) but rejects Husserl's depiction of it as 'object dependent'. Heidegger observes that we do not actually experience ourselves as being strictly conscious 'of' an object because objects already exist in our world before we are conscious of them, so consciousness cannot serve as the foundation for my relationship with the world, as Husserl insists. Rather, my experience is that of being thrown into a situation that overwhelms me with a repertoire of impressions and sensations, none of which can be isolated from the others in the fashion that Husserl's phenomenological method promises. In Heidegger's modification of intentionality, he posits it, not as a vehicle of consciousness, but as my ontological embeddedness in the world with others, characterised by an ever present sense of concern (Sorge) and foreboding. In other words, I do not establish a connection with the world by intending objects in it; I am already part and parcel of the world before I endeavour to take stock of it, so my consciousness of objects is always one step behind my engagement with it. This distinction has enormous implications about the role knowledge plays in experience. In Husserl, the task of phenomenology is to examine the objects in my world whereas, for Heidegger, the task is to make myself at home in the world by being with it, so that the question of consciousness itself becomes superfluous. Thus Heidegger's conception of phenomenology (and the role intentionality plays in it) conceives it as a form of therapy, whereas for Husserl it is strictly a mode of investigation whose ultimate purpose is to apprehend reality, a task that Heidegger dismisses as irrelevant to the primacy of being. Heidegger's thesis inspired the various schools of existential analysis that followed in Freud's wake, due to his emphasis on the respective roles of anxiety and equanimity in everyday living, and his project of reclaiming one's selfhood from the relentless forces of social convention, an aspect of his philosophy that distinguishes it from contemporary relational perspectives.
*Sartre both agrees and disagrees with Husserl and Heidegger in his interpretation of intentionality. He agrees with Husserl that intentionality is rooted in consciousness but rejects its 'constituting' function as well as Husserl's claim that consciousness is a product of the ego, problems that Sartre devoted an early work to (The Transcendence of the Ego). For Sartre intentionality is a structure of my being in the world and is prior to my capacity to determine my subjective role in it, a position that owes much to Heidegger, though Sartre rejects Heidegger's primacy of being-with-others. Hence Sartre rejects Husserl's 'ego-centric' version of intentionality as well as Heidegger's 'world-centric' interpretation of it, and posits in their place a conception of intentionality that focuses on my coming-into-awareness of the objects in my world that are disclosed to me by my solitary gaze.
Whereas Heidegger views intentionality as a mode of becoming oneself in the context of being with others, Sartre sees the human predicament in terms of the isolation one feels as a consequence of being rooted in irresolvable conflict with others, an important theme in Sartre's novels.
Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty combines elements of Husserl's and Heidegger's respective positions, and is perhaps more faithful to them than was Sartre. Unlike Heidegger, who situates human existence in the 'worldliness of the world', Merleau-Ponty locates intentionality in the body. Thus the individual's perspective is located in a spatial orientation that is necessarily unique to each person. Moreover, consciousness is conceived as 'bodily-consciousness', a theme that Merleau-Ponty demonstrates brilliantly in his early work (Phenomenology of Perception). Unlike Husserl and Heidegger, who give so much weight to consciousness and being, respectively, Merleau-Ponty reinterprets the conventional understanding of perception by making it not antithetical to rationality, but the source of consciousness and experience alike, fusing the three into one. Like Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre before him, Merleau- Ponty was intent on solving the mind/body dilemma that was inherited from Descartes; in Merleau-Ponty's case, there is no mind/body split to solve because the mind and body are 'intertwined' and inseparable, a notion that is consistent with certain schools of Buddhism. These distinctions are necessarily oversimplifications of theses that are both complicated and difficult to explain, but serve to show the central importance that intentionality plays in phenomenology. The inherently technical and philosophical senses of the term should not be confused with the common sense understanding of 'intention' or the psychoanalytic notion of unconscious 'motive' or 'gain'. Intentionality is not a psychological concept of motivation but a philosophical category that addresses my relationship with the world and, hence, others. More recently, the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, has employed intentionality but in ways that are fundamentally alien to phenomenology. Moreover, the concept of intentionality is complementary to another important phenomenological concept, intersubjectivity, which plays a central role in Husserl's, Heidegger's, Sartre's, and Merleau- Ponty's respective philosophies. The term intersubjectivity has also insinuated its way into contemporary psychoanalytic literature but, again, in a manner that is inconsistent with the way phenomenologists typically employ it.
See also: intersubjectivity; phenomenology/ phenomenological method.
- Mohanty, J. N. (1972) The Concept of Intentionality. St Louis: Warren Green, Inc.
- Zahavi, D. (2001) Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
M. G. T.